Jackson v. Franke, 364 Or 312, 434 P3d 350 (2019).  The Supreme Court held that petitioner Jackson was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to object to a medical diagnosis of sexual abuse in the absence any physically corroborating evidence ten years before the Supreme Court held that such evidence was inadmissible.  The Supreme Court sent the case back to the Court of Appeals, which determined that counsel's failure to object to the diagnosis did not constitute inadequate assistance of counsel.  Jackson v. Franke, 304 Or App 503, ___ P3d ___ (2020).  A petition for review is now pending in the Supreme Court.  Jackson contends that the Court of Appeals erred, because the standard of practice, at the time Jackson's case was tried, was to object to that sort of evidence.

Kinkel v. Persson, 363 Or 1, 417 P3d 401 (2018).  Kip Kinkel was 15 years old and hallucinating from untreated schizophrenia when he killed his parents, then killed two more people during a shooting spree at his high school.  The Supreme Court held that a 112-year sentence for a 15-year old child did not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, because schizophrenia cannot be cured.

Tiner v. Premo, 284 Or App 59, 391 P3d 816, rev den 361 Or 886 (2017).  The Court of Appeals set aside Tiner's conviction for aggravated murder after the government conceded that it had unlawfully withheld evidence that would have been favorable to Tiner's defense.  Andy Simrin and co-counsel W. Keith Goody worked with private investigators Peter De Muñiz and Typhanny Tucker and Mitigation Specialist James Hudson on the case.

Porter v. Board of Parole, 281 Or App 237, 383 P3d 427 (2016), rev den 361 Or 100 (2017).  Porter pled guilty to aggravated murder after beating a police officer to death.  After he served the 25-year minimum period of confinement, the Board of Parole agreed that he had proven he was likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time, and it scheduled his release from prison.  Members of the public, including then-governor Kitzhaber, protested that despite proving he was likely to be rehabilitated, Porter should remain in prison.  In response, the Board of Parole  re-opened Porter's release hearing and scheduled it to re-convene after Porter's scheduled release date.  The Court of Appeals held that the Parole Board could not reconvene an inmate's release hearing after the date for his scheduled release has elapsed.

State ex rel Walraven v. Department of Corrections, 358 Or 71, 362 P3d 1163 (2015).  Walraven was 14 years old when he committed aggravated murder.  In this mandamus case, the Supreme Court first ordered the trial court to conduct a "second look" hearing after completing half of his 25-year minimum period of confinement.  At that hearing, a judge found that Walraven proven by clear and convincing evidence that he had been rehabilitated, and the judge ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) to prepare a release plan.  DOC refused to comply with the judge's order, claiming that it did not have to comply with the court order while appealing it.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that DOC could not ignore the trial judge's order while appealing it.  DOC's appeal, based on its contention that the trial court was not authorized to comply with the Supreme Court's order was ultimately unsuccessful.  Walraven was released from custody and is a frequent public speaker and an active advocate for justice-driven outcomes in criminal justice system, with an emphasis on helping turn youthful offenders around.

M.K.F. v. Miramontes, 352 Or 401, 287 P3d 1045 (2012).  A person seeking a stalking protective order may also seek monetary damages in the same case.  If they do, the Oregon Constitution entitles the respondent to a jury trial for the damages portion of the case.

C.L.C. v. Bowman, 249 Or App 590, 277 P3d 634 (2012).  C.L.C. obtained a stalking protective order against Bowman.  Bowman subsequently made statements about C.L.C. on his web blog.  Later, when he asked the court to vacate the stalking order, he argued that his online speech could not be considered by the judge at the hearing to vacate the stalking order unless it constituted an explicit threat as defined in State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999) (see below).  The Court of Appeals disagreed.  It held that Bowman's online ruminations could be considered by a judge who needs to determine whether the circumstances warranting the stalking order in the first place no longer exist.

State v. Haugen, 351 Or 325, 266 P3d 68 (2011).  In this case that made international news, inmate Haugen, who had been convicted of aggravated murder, asserted that he wanted to drop his available legal challenges and be executed, despite evidence that he was not legally competent to make that decision.  In this opinion, the Supreme Court held that Haugen could be executed.  That decision led then-governor John Kitzhaber to declare a moratorium on the death penalty in Oregon.  The moratorium has been continued by Governor Kate Brown. 

Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or 592, 260 P3d 448 (2011).  Representing himself and litigating his case by phone from within the Oregon State Correctional Institution, inmate legal assistant Conrad R. Engweiler won a writ of mandamus in the Marion County Circuit Court.  The writ directed the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision to conduct a hearing to determine Engweiler's actual term of incarceration after he was sentenced for a crime he committed as a juvenile in 1990.  The case was appealed, and this was Mr. Simrin's fourth appearance in the Supreme Court on behalf of Mr. Engweiler over a nine-year period, all related to the Board's refusal to conduct a prison term hearing.  In a 48-page opinion written by Chief Justice Paul J. De Muñiz, the Supreme Court ordered the Board to conduct the prison term hearing that it was supposed to have conducted more than 20 years ago.  The Board established a tentative release date in 2018.  In his fifth trip to the Supreme Court for Engweiler, Mr. Simrin contended that the Department of Corrections was required to credit Engweiler with earned time credits against his term of incarceration, as the Supreme Court had indicated would be required in an earlier opinion.    Click here to watch Andy Simrin argue Mr. Engweiler's case in the Oregon Supreme Court.   The Supreme Court agreed.  Engweiler v. Department of Corrections, 354 Or 549, 316 P3d 264 (2013).  Engweiler was ultimately released and is now a successful businessman.

Kincek v. Hall, 217 Or App 227, 175 P3d 496 (2007).  The petitioner's conviction for attempted murder was set aside in this post-conviction proceeding because the petitioner's original trial attorney failed to call a psychologist as an expert witness to answer hypothetical questions that could have assisted the jury in determining whether the petitioner intended to kill the victim when he threatened her.

Ornelas and Ornelas, 217 Or App 1124, 174 P3d 1077 (2007).  In this divorce case, the Court of Appeals reversed a judgment that granted half the value of a diamond ring to the husband, because the wife had been given the diamond as a gift before the marriage.  It did not matter that the couple mistakenly thought that the diamond was a fake until a jeweler examined it during the marriage and that the couple couple then used money from their joint checking account to have the diamond mounted on a new band for the wife to wear.

State ex rel Engweiler v. Cook, 340 Or 373, 133 P3d 904 (2006).  An inmate sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole is entitled to earn good time credits for appropriate institutional behavior.  Once the Board of Parole determines the inmate's term of incarceration, the inmate may begin earning a reduction in his term of incarceration.  An inmate cannot have his term of incarceration reduced below any statutorily required minimum, such as a Measure 11 Minimum Sentence, by earning good time.

State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). The single disputed issue in this criminal case was who fired the shot that killed the victim.  The trial court had refused to allow the jury to consider evidence that the alleged victim had made numerous suicide threats, because the last threat was two years before the shooting.  The Oregon Supreme Court reversed the defendant's conviction for murder, because the exclusion of evidence that was central to his defense prevented him from getting a fair trial.  The Davis case is uniformly cited as the definitive case for the "harmless error" standard used by Oregon's appellate courts.  "Harmless error" means that, even if a trial judge made an incorrect legal ruling, the judgment will be affirmed if the error had little, if any, likelihood of affecting the outcome of the trial.

State v. MacNab, 334 Or 469, 51 P3d 1249 (2002).  Requiring a convicted sex offender to register and report annually to a law enforcement agency does not constitute punishment.  Consequently, applying the registration requirement retroactively does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. 

State v. Jackson, 178 Or App 233, 36 P3d 500 (2001).  The defendant, a prison inmate, was accused of committing a crime against his cellmate.  His trial was conducted in a makeshift courtroom that was set up inside the prison.  The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, because the trial inside the prison violated his constitutional right to a public trial.

State v. Fugate, 332 Or 195, 26 P3d 802 (2001)
A new law that changes the rules of evidence in a way that favors only the prosecution cannot be applied to cases that arose before the new law was enacted.  The retroactive application of such a law violates the constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws.

Bollinger v. Board of Parole, 329 Or 505, 992 P2d 445 (1999).  The Board of Parole could not, prior to 1985, require an inmate to go out on parole against his wishes.  Until then, an inmate could refuse parole and stay in prison until his good time time date, at which time he would be entitled to be unconditionally released.

State v. Edson, 329 Or 127, 985 P2d 1253 (1999).  A court cannot order someone to do something, as a condition of probation, that is impossible.  In this case, the sentencing court ordered the defendant to pay a large sum of restitution, despite the fact that it found that her disability made it impossible for her to do so.  The condition of probation was unlawful and required that her case be sent back to the trial court for re-sentencing.

State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999).  In this criminal stalking case, the Oregon Supreme Court held that communicative conduct can be prosecuted as stalking only if the communication is threatening.  Otherwise, a person could be prosecuted for exercising their right to free speech.  Even if the speech is non-threatening, it may still provide context for non-expressive conduct that may be prosecuted as stalking behavior. 

State v. Gile, 161 Or App 146, 985 P3d 199 (1999).  An adjudication of guilty except for insanity does not count as a criminal conviction.

State v. Norris-Romine, 134 Or App 204, 894 P2d 1221 (1995).  Oregon's first anti-stalking law was declared unconstitutional in this case.  The problem was that the phrase "without legitimate purpose" in the statute had no discernable meaning.  Criminal laws must give fair warning about what is prohibited and what is not, so that the ordinary person can make an informed decisions about what they can do, and this law was impermissibly vague about what might be prohibited. The Oregon legislature amended the law and clarified it.  The Oregon Supreme Court held that the current version of the law is constitutional in State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 977 P2d 379 (1999).